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Moral Theology on War
A Complete Course
based on St. Thomas Aquinas and the Best Modern Authorities
by
John A. McHugh, O.P.
and
Charles J. Callan, O.P.
New York City, Joseph F. Wagner, Inc.,
May 24, 1958
Nihil Obstat: |
Elwood Ferrer Smith, O.P., S.T.M.
Benjamin Urban Fay, O.P, S.T.LR.
John A. Goodwine, J.C.D., Censor Librorum |
Imprimi Potest: |
Very Rev. William D. Marrin, O.P., P.G., S.T.M |
Imprimatur: |
Francis
Cardinal Spellman,
Archbishop of New York |
1376.
War is defined as a state of conflict between two or more sovereign nations
carried on by force of arms.
(a) It is a state of conflict, and so differs from passing conflicts, such
as battles, skirmishes, campaigns. The enemy in war is not only those with
whom one is actually fighting, but all those who side with them, as counsellors,
helpers, etc.
(b) War is between sovereign nations, and so differs from civil war, sedition,
riots, duels. Moreover, war is made by nation against nation, not against particular
individuals or groups of individuals within a nation.
(c) It is carried on by force of arms, and soldiers from trade war, rivalry
in preparedness for war, embargo, blockade, breach of diplomatic relations,
etc.
1377.
There are two kinds of war, just and unjust.
(a) War is just when undertaken for a right cause (e.g., the independence
of the nation);
(b) It is unjust when undertaken for a wrong cause (e.g., the enslavement
of a nation).
1378.
Just war is either offensive or defensive.
(a) Offensive war is attack made on an enemy in order to avenge an
injury or enforce a right (e.g., invasion of the enemy�s territory
to obtain compensation for damages inflicted by him);
(b) Defensive war is resistance to unjust attack made or menaced
by an enemy (e.g., war made on the invader of one�s country).
1379.
Just war is called defensive in two senses.
(a) In the strict sense, it is defensive when the nation whose rights are unjustly
attacked does not initiate hostilities, that is, does not declare or begin
the war.
(b) In a less strict sense, it is defensive when the nation unjustly attacked
declares war or strikes the first blow. Thus, if the innocent nation knew that
the enemy was secretly preparing war against its independence, it would be
on the defensive, even though it declared war.
1380.
War is not against the law of God.
(a) Under the law of nature Melchisedech blessed Abraham returning from victory
over the four kings (Gen., xiv. 18�20).
(b) Under the written law, God many times ordered or approved of war, as can
be seen from Exodus and following books in numerous places.
(c) Under the New Law, John the Baptist acknowledged the lawfulness of the
soldier�s profession (Luke, iii. 14), a centurion was praised by Christ
(Matt., viii. 10), Acts, x. 2, speaks of the officer Cornelius as a religious
man, and St. Paul lauds warriors of the Old Testament such as Gedeon, Barac,
Samson, etc. (Heb., xi. 32�34). Our Lord Himself used physical force
against evildoers (John, ii. 14 sqq.).
1381.
Certain sayings of our Lord � for example, that those who take the sword
shall perish by the sword (Matt., xxvi. 52), and that one should not resist
evil (Matt., v. 39) � are not an endorsement of extreme pacifism, but
are respectively a condemnation of those who without due authority have recourse
to violence, and a counsel of perfection, when this serves better the honor
of God or the good of the neighbor. Moreover, these words of Christ were
addressed, not to states, which are responsible for the welfare of their
members, but
to individuals. The Quakers have done excellent service for the cause of
world peace, but their teaching that all war is contrary to the law of Christ
cannot
be admitted. The spirit of the Gospel includes justice as well as love.
1382.
War is not against the law of the Church.
(a) The Church has never condemned war as such. She has always labored for
the promotion of peace or for the lessening of the evils of wars that could
not be prevented; but her official declarations and the writings of the Fathers
and Doctors show that she recognized that recourse to arms by nations is
not necessarily sinful.
(b) The Church has put her approval on some wars as necessary and laudable.
Thus, the Crusades, to which the salvation of Christian civilization is due,
were promoted by the Church; military orders for the defense of the Holy
Sepulchre were instituted by her, and she has raised to the honors of the
altar soldiers
like Sebastian, Maurice, and Martin of Tours.
1383.
War is not against the law of nature.
(a) As the law of nature allows even a private individual to use force to
drive off an unjust aggressor, it cannot be unlawful for a nation to have
recourse
to defensive war when its rights are invaded.
(b) As the law of nature allows the individual to seek satisfaction for injury
and restitution for loss, it cannot be unlawful for a nation to make offensive
war when another nation will not make reparation, unless compelled to it
by force. If physical coercion were unlawful, a conscienceless nation would
take
advantage of this at the expense of other nations, and thus a premium would
be set on iniquity.
1384.
Like every other act, war is not morally good, unless its object, its purpose
and its circumstances are in accord with right. War is not lawful, therefore,
unless the three following conditions exist:
(a) Hostilities must be authorized by the public authority, for the care
of the State against internal and external disturbances has been committed
to
the ruler (Rom., xii. 4; Ps. lxxxi. 4), and the individual or the subject
state can have recourse for protection of its rights to the higher authority.
(b) There must be a just cause for war, that is, some fault on the side of
the other nation; for, if a nation may not use force against its own subjects
without sufficient reason, much less may it do so against those who are not
its subjects.
(c) There must be a right intention, that is, the desire to obtain some good
or to ward off some evil. Even if war is declared by the proper authority
and there is a sufficient reason for it, those who take part in the war are
guilty
of sin if they have evil motives, such as the exercise of cruelty, revenge,
pride, or avarice. To delight in war because one loves excitement or wishes
to show one�s skill or get promotion, is not a right frame of mind.
1385.
What public authority has the right to declare war?
(a) Ordinarily, only the sovereign power � that is, the person or body
in whom the chief authority is vested according to the constitution of the
nation � can make war. War is an act of the nation, and hence only
the authority that represents the nation can make war. Subordinate bodies
in a
confederation or union of states have the right to make war, if custom or
law allows it.
(b) In extraordinary circumstances, an inferior power can authorize war,
as when war is necessary and it is impossible to await a declaration from
the
sovereign power. Thus, if a province were suddenly invaded, it would be lawful
for the head of the province to make war on the invaders at once. It seems,
indeed, that the head of a province could justly authorize the invasion of
a neighboring state, to protect such province against aggressions, if the
central authority would do nothing; for such a war would be really defensive.
1386.
In order that the cause of war be just, it is necessary that the enemy nation
has done or now menaces an injury which cannot be repaired without war, and
which is so serious that the evils of war are less than that of toleration.
(a) Thus, a serious injury or grave dishonor inflicted by another nation
is the only just cause for the armed conflict which constitutes war, for
war is
exercised as a punishment or a compulsion, and these are unjust if no grave
and formal fault is supposed.
(b) Only an injury that cannot be otherwise repaired is a just cause for
war, because a state has no right to use force against another sovereign
state except
as a last resort. Hence, if the country at fault has already made satisfaction
or has promised to make satisfaction, war should not be declared.
(c) Only an injury so grave that it outweighs the risks and losses of war
is a justification for making war, for when two effects, one good and one
evil,
follow from an act, there must be a proportionately grave reason for permitting
the evil effect before acting (see 104, 105). It would be wrong to avenge
some small insult or some isolated injury at the expense of immense treasure
and
enormous loss of life. Modern warfare is so devastating that only the gravest
reasons known to society can authorize it. For, according to scientists,
a single H-bomb may cause death and destruction over a wide area, perhaps
the
space of a hundred square miles. In view of the havoc which is foreseen to
outweigh the benefits of victory, it could happen that a nation with justice
on its side and the potential to wage war would nevertheless not be justified
in waging war (see 1410). This destructive power of modern weapons, however,
need not imply a sweeping condemnation of all warfare. Spiritual values,
e.g., freedom from tyranny, freedom to worship God, still hold primacy over
material
values and can be deemed so precious as to outweigh the great loss off lives
and property involved in defending them or recovering them through modern
warfare. �A
people menaced by, or already victims of unjust aggression, if it desires to
think and to act in a Christian manner, cannot remain in passive indifference.� (Pope
Pius XII, Christmas Message of 1948).
1387.
In comparing the advantages and disadvantages of war, one should take into
consideration, not only the losses oneself will suffer, but also the losses
that will be suffered by others.
(a) Thus, if the enemy nation will be ruined as the price of one�s
obtaining some small right, charity would urge that one abstain from war.
(b) If the world in general or posterity will suffer greater evils materially
or spiritually than a nation is now suffering from the denial of some non-essential
right, charity at least should rule out a declaration of war.
1388.
Is there a just reason for war, when, a fault has been committed on both
sides?
(a) If the injuries are about equal and still in being, there is no reason
for war, for neither nation is in a position to accuse the other of injustice.
(b) If the injuries are quite unequal or one nation has shown a willingness
to cease from injury, the less guilty nation has a right to make war; but
it should first clear itself of injustice, before it proceeds to chastize
injustice
in the other.
1389.
Sufficient causes for making war are:
(a) Grave injury to the honor of a nation, such as insult to its ruler or
ambassadors (II Kings, x.);
(b) Injury to the natural right of the nation to existence, self-preservation,
property, free action within its own sphere; thus, a people may make war
to defend their independence (I Mach., iii. 59), to recover territory taken
from
them unjustly, to resist a violation of neutrality (II Kings, viii. 5), to
protect their own citizens and commerce;
(c) Injury to the rights of the nation under positive law. Thus, a nation
may make war to uphold important international agreements, to enforce the
observance
of treaties, and the like.
1390.
Injury done to a third nation or to the subjects of a third nation may also
be a sufficient reason for war.
(a) Thus, out of justice, a nation is obliged to help its allies in a just
war; for to help those with whose interests one�s own interests are
involved is only self-defense.
(b) Out of charity, a nation that has the right of intervention may lawfully
go to war to protect a weaker nation against a stronger and bullying nation,
to assist a government unjustly attacked by its subjects, or to help innocent;
subjects who are tyrannized over by their government.
1391.
Is it lawful to go to war over religion or morality?
(a) Error in the religion or immorality in the practices of another people
is not a sufficient reason for making war on them. No one can be forced to
believe, says St. Augustine; and it is likewise true that no one can be forced
to love virtue, whereas external conformity without conviction or love is
hypocritical. Moreover, a nation has no authority to correct the sins of
those not subject
to it. Hence, it would not be right to attack a people for the sole reason
that it was pagan or polygamous.
(b) Interference, however, with the religious rights of others or sinful
practices that are injurious to others are a sufficient reason for war. No
war ever had
a more legitimate cause than the Crusades, which were undertaken to defend
the Christian religion against the unspeakable atrocities of infidels. The
cause of humanity justifies a war to put an end to such evils as cannibalism
or human sacrifice.
1392.
Is it lawful to make war on another nation in order to bring to it the benefits
of modern civilization?
(a) If the uncivilized nation lacks a government and suffers from disorder,
it is an act of charity for a civilized nation to set up a government there
which will act for the benefit of the people of the country. It is also lawful
to make war on those who resist the government thus established.
(b) If the uncivilized nation has its own orderly form of government and
is at peace, no other nation has the right to interfere under pretext of
introducing
a higher type of government. Colonial expansion is not a sufficient reason
for war in such circumstances.
1393.
The following causes for war are not sufficient:
(a) Motives clearly sinful are such as do not suppose any injury done by
the other nation, but rather some evil passion of pride, greed, jealousy,
suspicion,
or selfishness on one�s own side. Hence, it is not lawful to go to war
for the glory of a ruler or of the nation, for the enlargement of one�s
territory, for the advantage that may be gained over a commercial rival,
for the preservation of the balance of power, or for the prevention of difficulties
at home.
(b) Motives apparently just, but really sinful, are injuries done by another,
if one has secretly provoked them in order to have a pretext for war. It
is not right to make war on a people because of attacks made by their citizens,
if these attacks were purposely caused by one�s own citizens.
(c) Motives of displeasure with another nation are not sufficient as motives
for war, if the other nation has violated no right of justice, but only acted
in a way not consonant with charity or friendship. Thus, the fact that one
nation denies another financial assistance or the tariff advantages granted
to a third nation is not a casus belli; for in matters of benevolence or
privilege there is no strict claim or title, and hence no right to have recourse
to arms.
1394.
Is war lawful when the justice of the cause is doubtful?
(a) The government may not declare war, unless it is morally certain that
right is on its side. The consequences of war are so dreadful, and the use
of force
against another nation is such an extreme measure, that one should refrain
from hostilities as long as one�s moral right is uncertain.
(b) Volunteers not already enlisted may not offer their services to a belligerent,
unless they are morally certain that his cause is just. They participate
in war from choice, and they should assure themselves that their choice is
correct.
(c) Subjects called to the colors should fight for their country, even if
they are in doubt about the justice of the cause, for the presumption is
on the
side of the government. This does not mean, however, that one should be willing
to fight for one�s country, right or wrong, nor that one would be obliged
to fight for a cause manifestly unjust, or to obey an order flagrantly wrong.
1395.
What is the meaning of �moral certitude� in the previous paragraph?
(a) Some moralists believe that a high degree of probability of the righteousness
of his cause suffices in order that a ruler may take steps towards war.
(b) The greater number of moralists, however, hold that no degree of probability
suffices. The justifying reasons must be clearer than day, and the state
which goes to war must not entertain a single doubt that its cause is right.
This
opinion we prefer; for, if a jury may not sentence an accused to death as
long as there is a reasonable doubt of his innocence, neither ought a nation
to
pass what is really a death sentence on hundreds or thousands of citizens
as long as there exists a doubt of a compelling reason for such a course.
It should,
however, be observed that a ruler who has only probable evidence that an
injury has been done already, may have certainty that it will be done, if
it is not
prevented by war.
1396.
Is it possible that the cause of war should be just on both sides?
(a) Materially or objectively, the cause of war is just only on one side,
for, if one nation has the right to demand satisfaction or restitution, manifestly
the other nation has no right to refuse or resist.
(b) Formally or subjectively, the cause of war is just only on one side,
if the facts and obligations are known to both disputants, for the nation
that
knows the right of the other side and yet opposes it, does not act in good
faith.
(c) Formally or subjectively, the cause of war is just on both sides, if
the nation that is objectively in the wrong is subjectively persuaded that
it is
in the right. And, even though a government is in bad faith, its people as
a rule will be in good faith as a result of not understanding the facts or
merits of the controversy.
1397.
It is possible that there should be objective justice and injustice on the
same side.
(a) Thus, the side which is just as regards the cause of the war, may be
unjust in its conduct of the war on account of the unlawful means it employs
to win,
or its continuation of a hopeless struggle.
(b) The side which was just as regards the original cause of the war, may
be unjust as regards a new cause that appears. Thus, a nation which goes
to war
to regain a lost territory, but which continues to fight for the sake of
conquest after the legitimate end has been achieved, contends for a just
cause at the
beginning, but for an unjust cause later on.
(c) The side whose grounds are justifiable from the immediate point of view
may be in the wrong if causes are traced farther back.
1398.
What are the duties before the beginning of war, according to natural law?
(a) Examination of the Cause of War --- It is clear that those charged with
the declaration of war are bound to examine diligently and prayerfully into
the dispute, weighing the reasons on both sides, and asking light from on
high. To this end they should seek the counsel, not of a few, but of many � not
merely among those who are experts in the diplomatic, legal, economic, and
military aspects of the question, but also among those who will look at the
matter from its ethical side and who are guided by fairness and justice.
Since it is the people who have to bear the burdens of war, it seems that
many wars
in the past would have been prevented, had the wishes of the people been
consulted.
(b) Judgment about the Merits of the Controversy � It is also clear
that those who have to decide for war or peace should be impartial in their
judgment.
Hence, they have to be on their guard against jingoism, yellow journalism,
and war interests, as well as against the pacifist or the favorer of a foreign
country at the expense of his own. They should not proceed to offensive war,
if their cause remains doubtful, unless the other side provokes war by refusing
peaceful settlement; but, if they are in possession, they have the right
to make defensive war.
(c) Judgment about the Feasibility of War � Prudence demands that,
even when a nation is convinced that it has a just cause to make war, it
should
nevertheless refrain from this, unless it has a well-grounded expectation
that war will improve matters (Luke, xiv. 31, 32). Statesmen who plunge their
people
into adventures whose end they cannot at all foresee, are criminals.
(d) Efforts at Peaceful Solution � Even if the cause is just and the
war feasible, hostilities should not be resorted to except as a last means.
Hence, pacific means � such as direct negotiation, mediation, arbitration,
judicial settlement, or pressure through trade embargoes, boycotts, breach
of diplomatic intercourse, etc. � should be tried in the first place.
1399.
The Chief Duties before Beginning War, According to International Law.
(a) Before war is declared, an ultimatum should be issued to the other nation,
offering it final terms and a last opportunity to make apology or satisfaction.
(b) Foreigners who are in one�s territory should be given an opportunity
to settle their affairs and leave the country within a reasonable time.
(c) Ambassadors and other representatives of the enemy should be provided
with passports.
1400.
In itself, as said above (see 1380 sqq.), war is not unlawful. But in the
light of the conditions required for a just war and of circumstances as they
are
today, can war at the present time be ever justifiable?
(a) If the supreme interests of a nation are at stake (such as its independence,
the policies or interests vital to its existence, its obligations under convenant
or treaty of peace), war can still be lawful today, for a nation cannot surrender
its right to self-defense, or betray its solemn engagements of cooperative
defense.
(b) If less than supreme interests are at stake, war today seems unjustifiable,
for what proportion is there between the minor interests of a single or several
nations and the enormous destruction of modern war and the dislocation of
international security? Efforts of statesmen to secure a world pact, outlawing
or renouncing
war as a means of national policy, indicates progress for this view.
1401.
What are the duties during war?
(a) One should use every lawful means, according to one�s position, to
secure victory for one�s country. Fighting to gain only a �stalemate,� in
itself, is immoral.
(b) One should avoid such means as are opposed to natural or international
law.
1402.
It is not true that all is fair in war, for even a just cause cannot sanction
unjust means. The commandments of God and the laws of nations retain their
force even amid the clash of arms. Examples of acts of war that are unlawful,
as being opposed to the natural law are the following:
(a) Acts of irreligion, such as wanton destruction of churches or monasteries;
(b) Attempts to seduce enemy soldiers from the obedience or loyalty owed
their commanders;
(c) Murder, that is, the direct killing of innocent and unarmed persons,
as when one refuses quarter to soldiers who wish to surrender, fires on an
officer
bearing a flag of truce, sinks passenger ships not engaged on errands of
war, massacres the civil population by raids from the air, places a defenseless
population at the mercy of savages or criminals employed as soldiers;
(d) The dishonoring of women, the establishment of brothels for soldiers;
(e) Stealing, such as the unauthorized pillage of a town or countryside;
(f) Lying, such as breaking treaties, not keeping faith with the foe, entering
into perjured agreements, circulating false stories of atrocities, forging
of documents, etc.
1403.
Just war is resistance to unjust aggression, and so the same means are lawful
in warfare as are lawful in private aggression.
(a) Thus, the means used against an aggressor must not be evil in themselves,
as when a person protects himself against a murderer by making an innocent
person a shield. Hence, in war one may not use any means that is opposed
to the law of God, or to human contracts or other obligations.
(b) The means employed must be such as are really necessary for overpowering
the aggressor. Thus, it is not lawful to kill a burglar when wounding him
will suffice for the protection of one�s property. Likewise, in war
it is not lawful to exterminate or depopulate an enemy, if the end of war
can be
attained by depriving the enemy of his weapons.
1404.
The principal classes of acts of war from the moral standpoint are:
(a) acts in which violence is done to things connected with religion;
(b) acts of violence against persons;
(c) acts of violence against property;
(d) acts used to conceal truth.
1405.
Acts of War and Sacred Times
(a) It is lawful to carry on warfare, offensively or defensively, on feasts,
when this is necessary, just as it is lawful to do servile work on those
days in case of necessity (I Mach., ii. 41; John, vii. 23).
(b) But if a suspension of hostilities can be arranged for feast days (especially
for the greater ones, such as Christmas and Easter), warfare should be discontinued
at those times.
1406.
Acts of War and Sacred Places
(a) It is lawful to attack a church building, if it is certainly being used
for military purposes. It is also lawful to attack fortifications, and thus
unintentionally to harm adjacent church buildings.
(b) It is not lawful, apart from these reasons of real military necessity,
to injure sacred places or edifices.
1407.
Acts of War and Sacred Persons
(a) It is lawful for clerics to cooperate in a just war in spiritual ways,
as by exhortations, prayers, and religious ministrations. Moses prayed for
the armies of Israel during battle (Exod., xvii. 8 sqq.), the priests accompanied
Josue around the wall of Jericho (Jos., vi. 4), and St. Bernard and other
holy men preached crusades.
(b) It is not lawful, apart from necessity (as in case of conscription),
for clerics to take part in actual fighting. Warfare is unbecoming in a cleric,
because he is enrolled for a spiritual warfare (11 Tim., ii. 4), and because
his leader, Christ, shed His own blood, not that of others (Matt., xxvi.
52).
Hence, the Church forbids clerics to volunteer as soldiers (Canon 141).
1408.
The persons to whom violence is done during war are:
(a) Combatants, that is, all those who are engaged in the actual promotion
of the war. Direct combatants are the fighters, such as the officers and
privates of army, navy, and air force; indirect combatants are the unarmed
auxiliaries
of the soldiers in military ways, such as makers of munition, transporters
of supplies, and those in the communication service.
(b) Non-combatants are enemy subjects who are neither fighters nor auxiliaries
of the armed forces, such as chaplains and members of the medical service
in the army, persons in civil life and occupation, old men, women, and children.
(c) Neutrals are those who are not subject to either of the warring contenders,
and who take no part in the hostilities, although they may sympathize with
one side.
1409.
The Killing or Wounding of Enemy Combatants
(a) According to natural law, it is lawful to kill or wound the enemy in
battle, or to starve him by blockade, just as it is lawful in self-defense
to kill
or wound an unjust aggressor.
(b) According to international law, it was expressly forbidden to attack
in ways that make war more cruel, without hastening the decision.
1410.
The Killing or Wounding of Non-Combatants
(a) The indirect killing of non-combatants (i.e., killing which is unintentional
and unavoidable) is lawful, according to the rules given for double effect
(see 103, 104). Hence, it is lawful to bombard the fortifications, arsenals,
munition works, and barracks of a town, to sink passenger liners that are
carrying arms or stores to the enemy, to cut off food supplies from a town
or country
in order to starve out its troops, although these measures will entail the
deaths of some civilians as well as of combatants. Humanity requires, however,
that an effort be made to spare the non-combatants, when possible, as by
serving warning of attack, so that they may be removed to safety. When it
is a question,
however, of the use of modern weapons (the atom, hydrogen or cobalt bombs)
on military targets in the vicinity of large cities, where it is foreseen
that many thousands of civilians will be killed or severely wounded, then
the principle
of double effect seems to rule out the lawfulness of using such devastating
weapons. The immediate evil effect, the slaughter of the innocents, could
hardly be called incidental and only reluctantly permitted. Concretely, the
inevitable
results of the use of such weapons would have to be intended directly, if
not as an end, at least as a means.
(b) The direct killing of non-combatants (i.e., killing which is intentional)
is unlawful and constitutes the sin of murder. Obliteration bombing, the
dropping of 11-bombs or atom bombs on a residential section of a city containing
no
military objectives, are of this character; for they are attacks on civilians.
It can not be argued that such an attack would probably break down the morale
of the citizens to such an extent that they would force their rulers to make
peace and so save many thousands of lives. For this argument is based on
the principle that a good end justifies evil means.
Occasionally it is argued that modern �total� warfare demands
that all citizens contribute to the war effort and that consequently everyone
is a combatant. The argument can hardly be sustained, for Catholic doctrine
insists that those whose participation is only remote and accidental are not
to be classified as combatants. In a well-documented article on �The
Morality of Obliteration Bombing,� by John C. Ford, S.J. (Theological
Studies, V, 1944, pp. 261-309), the validity of the distinction between combatants
and innocent non-combatants, even in the condition of modern war, is upheld.
Fr. Ford shows that in an industrial city, as round in the United States, three-fourths
of the population belong to the non-combatant category, and he lists more than
a hundred trades or professions which, according to the natural law, exclude
their members from the category of combatants. Direct attacks on such a population
clearly would constitute unjustifiable killing or wounding of non-combatants.
1411.
The Sentence of Death for Military Crimes
(a) It is lawful to sentence to death persons guilty of international crime,
such as those who approach when warned to halt, civilians who fire on the troops,
guerrillas, pirates, spies and deserters.
(b) It is not lawful to sentence to death persons not guilty of international
crime. Thus, a private soldier should not be executed because under orders
he killed a non-combatant; a hostage, not guilty of any capital crime, should
not be put to death, because his fellow-citizens for whom he is held rebel
or break faith.
1412.
Imprisonment and Restraint
(a) Combatants may be made prisoners of war, non-combatants are subject to
the restrictions of military rules when their territory is occupied, and in
very exceptional cases they may be transported behind their enemy�s lines.
(b) Prisoners of war and inhabitants of occupied territory are to be treated
as human beings, but not better than the soldiers of one�s own army.
They may not be reduced to slavery, held as hostages, tortured or starved to
death, or placed in front trenches as a shield to one�s own forces.
1413.
The Destruction or Seizure of Property During War
(a) The military property of the enemy nation or of its subjects may be confiscated
or destroyed, just as an individual has the right to destroy the weapon of
an unjust aggressor. Hence, a commander may demolish fortifications, war factories,
airships, warships, weapons and artillery; he may cut off or seize supplies
and provisions of money, food or drink.
(b) The public, non-military property of the enemy may be occupied by a successful
invader. He may appropriate movable goods (works of art and some others are
excepted by international law), and he may use immovable goods (public places
of worship, museums, etc., are excepted by law).
(c) As to private property of enemy subjects on land, international law requires
that immovables generally be respected, and movables can be seized only for
some necessary purpose of war. Requisitions and contributions may be exacted
and soldiers may be billeted in the homes of citizens, but only so much may
be levied as is needed for army maintenance and civil administration, and compensation
must be made, or a receipt be given for future compensation. War is made, not
against private persons, but against the state.
(d) As to private property on sea, the usage has been that the merchant ships
of the enemy may be captured and made a lawful prize.
(e) The property of neutrals on land must not be molested, unless it is not
really neutral, as when it is being used by the enemy. As regards the ships
and shipping of neutrals on the high seas, they are not up to the present protected
by international agreement. Rather the naval powers are divided between the
theories of command of the seas and freedom of the seas. Thus, Great Britain
claims the right to search, seize and hold the vessels or cargoes of neutrals
who carry contraband or attempt to trade with the enemy in the face of a blockade.
1414.
It is an axiom that booty taken in war belongs, not to the private soldiers,
but to their government. Hence, the question arises: Are private soldiers,
who take the goods of citizens without authorization from their officers, bound
to make restitution?
(a) If they take what is necessary for their own sustenance, they act against
military discipline, but not against justice, and are not bound to restore.
(b) If they take other things, they are bound to restore, since international
agreements make this a duty of justice. But, if neither of the belligerents
observed this agreement, the obligation of restitution cannot be insisted on
as grave.
1415.
Is it lawful to give over a city to be looted by the soldiery?
(a) In ancient times, this was sometimes permissible, as when compensation
and victory in a just war was otherwise impossible.
(b) In modern times and according to present international law, looting is
strictly forbidden. Violation of agreements by city heads gives no right to
attack the property of the citizens who are not responsible, and valiant defense
of the city by its troops does not forfeit the rights of the inhabitants to
their goods.
1416.
Stratagems in War
(a) It is lawful to use various artifices for concealing one�s plans
from the enemy, such as camouflage, smoke screens, censored reports of engagements,
etc. Thus, Josue by command of the Lord prepared an ambush for the citizens
of Hai (Jos., viii. 2).
(b) It is lawful also to conceal one�s identity by wearing the uniforms
of the enemy in order to obtain information about his plans. The Lord commanded
Moses to send out men to spy on the land of Chanaan (Num., xiii. 1). While
it is not lawful to tell or signify untruth, it is lawful to conceal the truth
from those who have no right to know it.
1417.
Reprisals are acts of retaliation by which one replies to unlawful aggressions
of the enemy by equivalent aggressions against him. Their morality depends
on circumstances.
(a) Thus, if the act of the enemy is opposed only to international law, it
is not unlawful to use the same act against him, for, since he has broken faith,
the treaty obligation no longer binds the other side. For example, if the enemy,
contrary to agreement, uses poison gas in warfare, it is lawful to use poison
gas against him. Reprisals should not be made, however, without authorization
from the proper authority.
(b) If the act of the enemy is opposed to natural law, it is not permissible
to retaliate by the same kind of acts. Two wrongs do not make a right. But
one may retaliate in lawful ways, or else issue a protest and await compensation
at the conclusion of the war. Thus, if the enemy murders the civil population,
this does not justify one in murdering enemy citizens who are in one�s
power.
1418.
Duties of the Nation Victorious in War
(a) The victorious nation must not prolong the war after victory has been gained,
or after the enemy has sued in good faith for peace or armistice.
(b) It must not exact from the defeated foe more than it has a just right to.
1419.
The Rights of the Victor
(a) If the cause of the victorious nation was unjust, its victory gives it
no claim, for might does not make right. On the contrary, it may be obliged
to make restitution to the defeated nation for the losses it has suffered.
(b) If the cause of the victor was just, the victorious nation has a claim
to three things:
- to the satisfaction or restitution for the sake of which
the war was undertaken;
- to compensation for damages caused by the enemy during
the war, and
- to guarantees against a recurrence of the former injury.
Supervision of peace treaties by an impartial tribunal has much to recommend
it, since victors are prone to disregard charity and justice when treating
with a conquered foe, and to extort from him forced agreements.
1420.
The Obligation of a Victor Whose Cause was Unjust
(a) If the victorious nation fought in good faith, and only later perceived
the injustice of its cause, it is bound to restore only those things which
it has not consumed, and which make it better off than it was before the
war.
(b) If it fought in bad faith, it should restore all. Victory does not prove
that one was right, but only that one was stronger. It does not make a bad
cause good.
1421.
The Obligation of a Victor Who Fought Without Due Authorization, or with
a Wrong Purpose
(a) Soldiers who inflict damage on the enemy against the orders of the commanders
(e.g., by burning dwellings, robbing private citizens, murdering, etc.),
are obliged to restitution for those injuries, for such acts are not war,
but brigandage.
(b) Soldiers who fight with a wrong motive (e.g., out of hatred), are not
obliged to restitution, since they have not committed injustice; for similarly
a judge,
who sentences a convicted criminal, sins if his motive is hate, but he is
not held to restitution.
1422.
What Indemnity may be Imposed on the Vanquished?
(a) According to justice, one may exact compensation for the losses and expenses
one has sustained on account of war, since the enemy is responsible for these.
(b) According to charity, one may be obliged to relinquish part of what is
owed, or to grant easier terms of payment, or to cancel a debt, as when the
enemy is greatly impoverished, or cannot easily pay at present.
1423.
In cases of doubt, as when counter claims are made and neither party is entirely
victorious, or when a vanquished nation denies its ability to pay what is
demanded, recourse may be had to other ways of settlement.
(a) Thus, in the former case a compromise or mutual condonation of claims,
especially if both sides are exhausted by the war, seems the reasonable solution.
(b) In the latter case submission to an impartial tribunal of arbitration
would benefit the victors as well as the vanquished, since in the long run
it is
not to the advantage of the former that the latter be deprived of its goods
and productivity.
1424.
Guarantees for the Future
(a) One may insist on such guarantees as will insure against a probable renewal
of the offense committed by the conquered nation. Hence, one may require
that it destroy or deliver over fortifications and munition plants, sink
warships,
reduce its military force, punish certain individuals, or depose certain
rulers.
(b) One may not insist on such guarantees as will make a renewal
of war by the enemy, now or in the future, absolutely impossible.
As said
above,
a nation has the right to go to war to defend itself against aggression,
but it has
no right to work at destroying equality or competition on the part
of other nations. Hence, it is not lawful to demand that the conquered
nation
surrender
its independence or the management of its affairs, or that one be
allowed to annex all the territory taken during war, if one�s
rights or reasonable security does not require these conditions.
Subjugation
or
temporary occupation
are lawful, however, if there is no other way of obtaining redress
or securities.
1425.
Punishment of Enemy Soldiers for Crimes Committed during War
(a) Special crimes committed during war (e.g., massacres of non-combatants)
may be punished, but the punishment should be visited on those responsible,
not on those who merely executed orders.
(b) The crime of the war itself should not be revenged on private soldiers,
for it is unjust to punish subjects for the madness of their officers and
rulers. As to the latter, moral guilt is not easily established. The Nurenberg
trials
held commanders and high officers responsible for crimes against humanity,
and not without precedent.
1426.
Preparation for Future Wars
(a) Reasonable preparedness is not only lawful, but a duty of the state to
its own people. A nation should have such a military establishment or such
alliances as will safeguard its right against probable attack.
(b) Unreasonable preparedness is unlawful since it burdens the people and
prepares the way for war. Examples of unreasonable preparations: maintenance
of an army
or navy far in excess of those nations of similar rank; oppressive military
expenses or burdens; maneuvers offensive to other governments or too dangerous
for the troops engaged; ruinous competition in armaments.
1427.
Preparation for peace or against war is a duty no less obligatory than preparation
for defensive war. Two chief ways of preparing for peace:
(a) Will for peace;
(b) Work for peace. (a) The will for peace is promoted when the nations educate their people to
a realization of the brotherhood of man, of the wrongfulness and folly of a
narrow nationalism, of the sinfulness of war which has not all the conditions
of a just war in its favor. Without the will for peace, conferences and treaties
will effect little.
(b) Work for peace is done by all who give their service to practical plans
for the prevention of war and the preservation of lasting world amity. Among
these plans are agreements among nations to substitute moral right for material
force, to abolish conscription and armaments, to establish international tribunals,
associations and world courts, to make arbitration of disputes among themselves
compulsory, to codify international law. History bears witness to the many
and great services to humanity which the Popes have rendered by acting as arbiters
between nations that were on the point of war. If jealousies prevent agreement
among governments, the peoples of the world should nevertheless continue to
work for peace and by constitutional means make their wishes prevail among
the governments. With the Church we should pray: �From pestilence, famine
and war, deliver us, O Lord.�
�truecatholic.us
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